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A COMPARISON OF RISK EVALUATION IN EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES
HELICOPTER OPERATION REGULATIONS
Joseph P. McLaine
Human Factors Division, Institute of Aviation
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Savoy, IL
Terry L. von Thaden, PhD
Human Factors Division, Institute of Aviation
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Savoy, IL
This study represents a comparison of Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) operations, between US Federal
Aviation Regulations (FARs), and European Joint Aviation Regulations Operations Specifications. Presently, US regulations
allow HEMS operators to conduct work under FAR Part 135, Commercial Aviation Operations, or under FAR Part 91, General
Aviation Operations. This allows HEMS operators to accept a greater level of risk by substituting lower minimum procedural
standards under FAR Part 91 than under FAR Part 135, and may be partly culpable for a higher rate of fatal crashes in HEMS
operations conducted under FAR Part 91. In stark contrast, explicit criteria and minimum operating considerations are stated in
the European regulations. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been slow to take a similar clear and firm regulatory
stance as that of its European counterpart regarding the human factors involved in the risk assessment of HEMS operations.
Providing clearly defined steps to analyze and mitigate unnecessary threats, developing optimum performance guidelines, as well
as minimum acceptable operational standards would benefit not only the US HEMS industry but also the patients and public it
serves by reducing exposure to preventable dangers.
Within the 2006 NTSB special report, Board members
stated that even though the HEMS industry is booming,
there is no data regarding the exact number, type or mission
summaries of HEMS operators in the United States (NTSB,
2006a). The HEMS industry has undergone a burgeoning
expansion in this country since the early 1990s, akin to
airline deregulation in the late 1970s. The number of
accidents has nearly doubled during this rapid period of
growth (Baker, 2006; NTSB 2006a). While there are
approximately 650 EMS helicopters operating in the US,
there appears to be sparse data on the number of outfits
providing HEMS services to the nation’s hospitals.
According to a recent study by McKenna and Nelms
(2005), the EMS marketplace can best be described as
“unsettled.” A large number of independent or stand-alone
programs have commenced operations unaffiliated with any
hospital or medical establishment. It has been primarily
these operators who have fueled the industry’s explosion in
recent years. The study further asserts that the HEMS
sector serves as a “pressure cooker,” and the stress is a
result of competition between operators. The tremendous
increase in the number of HEMS operators has oversaturated the available need for emergency helicopter
transport. Several studies have addressed aspects such as
operational control, risk assessment procedures, and expert
collaboration on whether immediate vertical evacuation
requires (or justifies) the added expense and risk of HEMS
operations (Baker, et al, 2006; Brathwaite et. al, 1998).

Introduction
The importance of rotary-wing and vertical flight air
transport in critical life-support missions (e.g. helicopter
transport) has been well documented (Baker et. al, 2006;
Gisvold, 2002; Brathwaite et. al, 1998). Additionally, major
natural disasters such as hurricanes, wildfires or floods,
have forced Emergency Management authorities to employ
helicopters in the rescue of citizens from otherwise
unnavigable terrain. The ability of rotary-wing aircraft to
provide platforms while hovering, or to land in tight spots
where fixed-wing aircraft would otherwise be unable to
operate, prove their worth in saving lives. In recent years
there have been numerous products designed specifically to
assist with the operational safety of this vital service,
including radar altimeters, weather radar and wire-strike
prevention kits. However, over the past ten years, even as
airframes and the technology used by aircrews have
improved, the rate of fatal crashes in emergency medical
services helicopters (HEMS) in the United States has risen
significantly (Baker et. al, 2006).
The vast majority of fatal HEMS crashes are categorized as
result of Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accidents,
such as continuance of flight into rapidly deteriorating
weather and/or unaided flight
during low visibility conditions (e.g., night). A recent
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Aviation
Special Investigation Report on Emergency Medical
Services Operations identified several issues regarding
training, decision-making, and policy in HEMS operations
(NTSB, 2006). Top among these issues were the safety
recommendations that all HEMS operations comply with
commercial operation specifications when medical
personnel are onboard, risk evaluation programs, and
formalized dispatch and flight following procedures.

While hospitals may appreciate the ever-present ability to
choose one or several HEMS operators when emergency air
transport may be required, several questions remain
concerning whether patients could be transported just as
quickly, and possibly safer, via ground ambulance. Even
though the HEMS industry provides a crucial benefit to many
citizens, especially those in rural areas and far from available
medical care, the service is dramatically over utilized. Fueling
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environment, needs and requirements of
individual operators in various regions or
operating conditions” (HAI, 2005:3).

this argument are studies analyzing air ambulance transport as
it affects the ultimate survival of trauma patients (Chappell, et
al., 2002; Brathwaite, et al., 1998). The authors concluded that
HEMS transport did not affect the estimated overall odds of
survival and proposed a reappraisal of the cost-effectiveness
and transport criteria when ground assets are also available.

Ambiguous Regulations. HEMS operations are covered
under Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, FAR Part
135: Commuter and On Demand Operations (FAA, 2006b).
Specifically, HEMS regulations are addressed in a single
section, 135.271, which covers only duty-day and flight hour
restrictions for aircrews. Other sections within FAR Part 135
address strict weather minimums and define several
equipment requirements for certificated operators. However,
as currently written, HEMS operations are required be
conducted under FAR Part 135 only when a patient is
actually transported; otherwise HEMS operations may be
conducted under FAR Part 91: General Operating & Flight
Rules, which is significantly less restrictive in terms of
weather and defined equipment minimums, especially in
uncontrolled airspace (see Table 1 for a comparison of FAR
Parts 135 and 91). This gap in regulatory oversight
effectively allows HEMS pilots, owners and dispatchers to
select which regulatory minimums they wish to comply with
during almost any segment of the mission. For example, a
HEMS operator could legally take off from their home
station with marginal Visual Meteorological Conditions
(VMC), and remain under VFR as defined by FAR Part 91
while enroute to an accident scene. Only after collecting the
patient(s) would they be required to apply the more stringent
operational minimums for weather and crew duty
considerations required under FAR Part 135. In actuality,
even the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
recognizes that a HEMS flight could consist of three distinct,
separate legs, each with their attendant regulations and safety
considerations: 1) positioning from base to patient pickup
(Part 91); 2) patient transport (Part 135); and 3) repositioning
back to base (GAO, 2007). Following this logic, there could
easily be twice as many flights conducted under the less
stringent regulations of Part 91 than under Part 135.

Understandably, the desire of both hospitals and HEMS
companies has been to improve the financial outcome of
operations, but unfortunately the desire to cut costs has led to
aggressive HEMS practices among some operators in the
industry. As an illustration, a successful HEMS mission flown
in a $4 million Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)-equipped
helicopter with all of the niceties and safety features the
company could install on the airframe earns the exact same
amount per mission as a $1 million basic Visual Flight Rules
(VFR)-equipped helicopter. Additionally, helicopter pilots may
be inadequately paid, especially those flying for independent
outfits. Instead of salaried positions, available with a select few
HEMS operators, the majority of HEMS pilots are paid by the
number of missions completed.
Not only are helicopters inherently unstable airframes and
more dangerous platforms than their fixed-wing counterparts,
their rescue missions involve much more dangerous hazards
(Durnford, et al., 1995; Braithwaite, 1997). HEMS missions
are often flown at night, into unfamiliar locations, oftentimes in
poor/deteriorating weather, and close to the ground, 0-500’
Above Ground Level (AGL) (Murdock, 1997). Wires,
antennae and other dangerous terrain features at such low
altitudes increase the danger for helicopter pilots.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has
acknowledged concerns about the HEMS industry, and has
taken steps to improve the training and awareness of pilots,
dispatchers, EMS flight crews, nurses, doctors and other
attending personnel beginning with a special task force in 2004
(FAA, 2006a). In a fact sheet released January 2006, the FAA
proposed a partnership to improve the safety culture at EMS
operators and recommended short- and long-term strategies for
accident reduction (FAA, 2006a). However, the FAA has
delayed issuing rule changes to the FARs, choosing instead to
work within the existing regulations. The FAA’s stated
immediate focus includes risk management training for all
HEMS flight crews, and provision of “airline-type FAA
oversight” through identifying regional HEMS operational
hubs (FAA, 2006a). Important safety issues such as clearly
defined HEMS weather minimums, equipment/crew
requirements for HEMS operators, and guidelines
for determining the necessity of air evacuation have yet
to be addressed.

Table 1. Comparison of FAR Parts 91 and 135

Weather
and
Visibility
Minimums
Equipment
Req’d

In fact, it appears there may be resistance and even industry
pressure on the FAA to avoid enhancing regulatory oversight
of the HEMS industry. In a publicly released whitepaper the
Helicopter Association International (HAI), addresses the
issues of increased regulation and states their vehement
opposition to such requirements with statement such as:
“Wide sweeping and arbitrary mandates of
equipage or aircraft capabilities of questionable
efficacy, or similar broad-brush interventions are
not appropriate and do not recognize the varied
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Part 91
“Clear of Clouds”
(< 1200’AGL in
Uncontrolled
Airspace)
Basic VFR / IFR
Requirements

Duty
Period

N/A

Crew Rest

N/A

Other

PIC
must
have
"adequate
opportunity to see
any air traffic or
obstruction in time to
avoid a collision."

Part 135
½ mile vis (DAY)
1 mile vis (NIGHT)
when flying < 1200’
AGL
Specified for each
certificate holder
No more than 8 hrs
of flight time in 24
consecutive hrs
10 consecutive hrs
preceding
/
8
consecutive
hrs
during any 24
Mandates
visual
reference to the
ground (DAY), and
visual reference to
surface
lights
(NIGHT)

and often time-critical decisions about whether or not to
launch a HEMS mission. A HEMS accident discussed in
the NTSB report cited a CFIT crash in Pyote, TX and listed
several contributing factors including the dark night
conditions, inadequate preflight planning and preparation,
and pressure to complete the mission induced by the pilot
because of the nature of the EMS rescue flight itself.

The FAA has also published a series of Operational
Specifications (OpSpecs) for certificated commercial
HEMS operators Under FAR Part 119 (FAA, 2006b), yet
these OpSpecs mainly encompass requirements for
management and technical personnel. This ambiguity
presents an opportunity for both pilots and HEMS
owner/operators alike to circumvent the FAA’s objective to
ensure safe practice and adequate decision-making when it
comes to air transport in emergency operations. This
ambiguity allows operators to avoid providing HEMS
aircrews the proper psychological framing needed when
making a decision to accept a mission or not.

Yet does the decision rest solely with the pilot? Companies
maintaining operational control (ownership) over various
HEMS operations have not been adequately addressed in
the regulations. For instance, a flight crew hired and paid
by the number of actual evacuations performed would be
far more likely to depart in marginal conditions with less
than adequate equipment, or accept a riskier destination
than a similar HEMS crew with a salaried position. There is
tremendous pressure to fly HEMS missions, including
corporate, competitive, situational and even pressure from
other pilots in the industry. The NTSB special report quotes
a pilot in Arizona as saying, “If I don’t fly at least 25
missions per month, I don’t get paid!” (NTSB, 2006a).

Much of the previous research has focused on accident
records, fatality reports, and other quantifiable outcomes of
HEMS mishaps (Baker, et al., 2006). However, there are no
available records regarding the frequency of pilots or
operators launching their aircraft in unsafe conditions, only
to subsequently abort, returning to base without serious
incident. While not historically tracked, data on these
aborted missions may allow researchers and safety
professionals the opportunity to determine risk patterns and
identify poor decision-making in the operational field.

The pressure to fly is often exacerbated by the practice of
hospitals simply calling whatever HEMS company is next
on the list until they find one that will accept the mission.
Several accident reports have noted cases where previous
flight crews had refused missions because weather was not
conducive to flight (NTSB, 2006). HAI maintains that:
“…adherence to current regulations is far more
effective than generating new regulations.
Within the bounds of prudent standardization
the individual operators should maintain the
flexibility to amend their shortcomings without
inheriting restrictive regulations that might be
the proper solution for someone else’s
problem” (HAI, 2005:4).

In actual modern practice, HEMS pilots and
owner/operators are presented with a wealth of information
about weather, mission type, route planning, and
operational requirements for the anticipated flight. With
each additional piece of information comes an increased
level of bias, which is ranked by importance of the role,
expertise, and cue correlation from Long Term Memory
(LTM). Situational, or suggestive, training as well as
procedural and/or design remediation can be proposed to
improve the institutional process of decision making
(Wickens, et al, 2000). The HEMS industry is a complex
web of operators, doctors, medical crews, ground support
personnel, and financial backers. Each of these players has
a representative sample of these biases and heuristics
present when making a decision whether to launch a
mission. One aspect of bias not covered in detail within the
research literature involves flight crew knowledge of the
specific details of the mission; does the pilot know the
condition of the patient and their need for evacuation?
Informing pilots of the nature of the emergency or
condition of the patient certainly offers motivation to
undertake a more risky course of action. By improving the
type and amount of training, providing realistic situations
where HEMS operators can apply new decision making
schema, and by improving the decision process within the
organizations themselves, the HEMS industry could see
significant reductions in the fatal crash rate.

HAI goes on to state that, “Ultimately, it is the
responsibility to some extent of the FAA, but primarily of
industry to take the steps necessary to enhance safety in
HEMS operations” (HAI, 2005: 8). Since the HEMS
industry does not adhere to a standard practice, it appears it
is time for the FAA to step in and apply more stringent
regulations on an industry entrusted with public welfare.
Comparing the Regulatory Stance on HEMS. In stark
comparison to the US, other countries engage in a vastly
different approach and stated philosophy towards HEMS
operations. While each country has individual needs and
regulatory bodies governing aviation in their individual
airspace, most states participate in the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards for safety,
security, efficiency and regulation of civilian air transport.
As the sole United Nations body charged with developing
international standards for aviation safety, ICAO has very
few Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
addressing concerns directly related to HEMS (ICAO,
2007), instead leaving the stringent governance of HEMS
operations to the discretion of the owner states.

Who is the Launch Authority? The Federal Aviation
Regulations are rather un-ambiguous when defining the
responsibility and authority inherent in the role of aircraft
Pilot in Command: “The Pilot in Command of an aircraft is
directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the
operation of that aircraft” (FAR 91.3(a)). While the pilot
exerts ultimate responsibility over the flight, there is a
chain of biases and influences that may emerge in his
decision-making process thus clouding his judgment.
However, the FAA does not explicitly address the complex

Interestingly, within the European continent, there has been a
concerted effort to manage aviation safety standards and
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Table 2. Comparison of HEMS Regulations

procedures through the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA; note
transition to the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
forthcoming). As a body of the European Civil Aviation
Conference (ECAC), which is itself a collection of aviation
regulatory authorities from a number of member European
countries, the JAA/ECAC endeavors to harmonize their
statutes closely with those from the US. The JARs make
numerous specific references to HEMS operations, yet
appear to be more conservative and specific in their
definitions and release authority guidelines than the FAA.
There are explicit definitions and lengthy descriptions of the
differences between the terms “HEMS,” “Air Ambulance,”
and “Search and Rescue-SAR” as well as a very
comprehensive section on risk mitigation (JAA, 2006).

JAR-OPS 3
Risk
Management
Crew
Required
Definition of
HEMS & Air
Ambulance

By separately defining “HEMS” and “Air Ambulance”
operations, the JAR-OPS 3 regulations draw an analogy
between these operations and a ground-based ambulance
[emphasis added]:
“If called to an emergency, an ambulance would
proceed at great speed, sounding its siren and
proceeding against traffic lights – thus matching
the risk of operation to the risk of a potential
death = HEMS operations,” and “For a transfer of
a patient (or equipment) where life and death...is
not an issue; the journey would be conducted
without sirens and...matching the risk to the
task = air ambulance operations.”(JAR OPS 3,
Subpart B: 2-B-2).

Equipment
Requirements

Launch
Authority

The aviation risk must
be proportional to
the task
At least a Pilot and a
HEMS Crewmember
occupying the two
front seats at all times
Comparative/potential
risk must only be to a
level appropriate to
the task
HEMS aircraft must
all meet stringent IFR
equipment
requirements
HEMS
designation
from
a
medical
professional,
and
conduct
of flight
remains
with
commander (PIC)

FAR Part 91 /
Part 135
N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A
Ultimately PIC,
but
fails
to
address
other
operational
considerations
within industry

It is interesting to note the actual differences in the
regulations between the FAA and the JAA in regard to
HEMS operations. The safety of “third party” non-flying
citizens on the ground, patients, as well as aircrews is of
utmost concern to the JAA. While the Europeans have
thoroughly addressed HEMS safety and risk considerations,
as well as maintained a very conservative threshold towards
its application, it appears as almost an afterthought in the
US regulations.

The JAR-OPS make clear distinctions between HEMS/Air
Ambulance, and SAR (i.e., SAR is usually conducted by
police and/or military units). However, they also state that
the SAR label shall not be used to circumvent the intent of
the JAR-OPS 3, or to permit HEMS operations to a “lesser
standard” (JAR OPS 3, Subpart B: 2-B-2.). The JAA
acknowledges that HEMS operations are “performed in the
public interest,” and as such, merit a thorough level of
control and regulation to minimize the public risk.

Rather than focusing on proactive efforts to improve safety
in the US HEMS community, there appears to be regulatory
stagnation and irresponsibility. The Air Medical Resource
Management (AMRM) program, a version of CRM that
integrates
pilots,
medical
crew,
and
ground
communications specialists, in the HEMS decision making
cycle has been proposed to the FAA (McKenna, 2005).
While this AMRM guidance was created for the FAA, they
have not yet publicly endorsed the practice. However,
numerous proactive HEMS operators have adopted the
AMRM concept on their own. Additionally, the FAA’s
proposals and guidance for increased training and
inspection of HEMS procedures have failed to address the
most significant problems facing the industry: fostering a
culture of safety and a deterministic decision-based
community of pilots, aircrews, owners, and medical crews
on the ground.

In stark contrast to the FAA, the JAR-OPS 3 section on
HEMS states decisively that [emphasis theirs], “The
underlying principle is that the aviation risk should be
proportional to the task” (JAR OPS 3, Subpart B: 2-B-2.).
The JAA even footnotes James Reason when addressing
the issue of Safety Management (JAA, 2006). The
European regulations expressly define concepts such as
comparative risk, risk management, and the concept of a
wide-ranging safety culture. The JAR-OPS 3 regulate the
HEMS crew composition, duty and rest periods, reference
Crew Resource Management (CRM) principles, as well as
explicitly cover risk management. Additionally, the JARs
describe how it is the responsibility of the medical
professional (doctor) to determine between HEMS/Air
Ambulance mission designation, and not the pilot’s
responsibility. HEMS mission designation is separate from
launch authority discussed above in the FARs, but the JAROPS 3 also state that the “commander (PIC) makes an
operational judgment over the conduct of the flight.” Table
2 shows the difference between the JAR OPS regulations
and the FARs.

Recommendations
An enhanced regulatory posture for HEMS operations by
the US government is strongly suggested. Regulations
addressing the specific risk considerations to HEMS
operations, as well as requirements for certification,
including training, equipment, operational oversight, and
launch authority would clarify what is now ambiguous in
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the regulations in use today. In addition, the regulations
need to clearly address stringent weather minimums for
HEMS operations, including provisions for forecast
weather, especially when planning flights in uncontrolled
airspace. Regardless of how many FAA Notices are
published; the regulation is the bottom line. HES operations
should be conducted under FAR Part 135 and HEMS
aircraft should be crewed by at least two qualified members
in the front seats to assist with obstacle detection and
avoidance, communication and navigation, as is mandatory
in the JAR OPS specifications. Minimum equipment
specifications and aircrew training is also recommended in
accordance with JAR OPS specifications.
Risk assessment and evaluation programs, including all
employees associated with the HEMS mission, from
dispatcher to doctor, should also be adopted. These
decision making tools would allow critical analysis,
undertaken by the all of the players involved in the
decision, of conditions that pose a hazard to the successful
completion of flights. In addition, decision support should
be provided regarding predetermined levels of risk
commensurate with the potential payoff gained in patient
safety and hospital care for launching an aircraft in support
of a mission. The goal would be to utilize HEMS in only
the most serious of conditions.
Helicopter air transport is a critical feature of our Nation’s
healthcare system, but the rise in accident rates in recent
years demonstrates a need to take a very critical look at all
aspects of the overall HEMS flight risk to the American
public. Any critical analysis of the HEMS industry in this
country must not separately consider the regulations, the
aircraft, or the individuals making the launch decisions; a
comprehensive review demands consideration of the
comprehensive picture in order to gain an appreciation for
the complexities and challenges facing HEMS operations.
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